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This box sets out the latest update of the Banco de España’s 
macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy. Compared 
with the previous projections in June,1 this exercise includes, 
among other recent information, the Quarterly National Accounts 
data for the first two quarters of 2017,2 and also information on the 
changes in the technical assumptions on which this projection 
exercise is based (see Table 1).3
The estimates point to the continuation of the economic expansion 
that began four years ago. In the medium term, the enhanced 
competitive position of the Spanish economy, the growing 
deleveraging of private agents and continuing favourable financial 
conditions, among other factors, will continue to underpin the 
present activity and employment growth cycle.
At the same time, the strength of activity since the start of the 
recovery has been partly in response to other forces whose 
momentum has gradually declined over the past year.4 In 
particular, compared with the expansionary fiscal policy stance of 
the period 2015‑16 and the declines in oil prices observed 
between mid‑2014 and 2016 Q1, in the most recent period the 
budgetary policy stance has been neutral and crude prices have 
risen moderately, although they are still around half their peak 
level. In consequence, these factors have ceased to act as growth 
drivers and now exert a virtually zero or even slightly contractionary 
impact. Moreover, the expansionary effect resulting, in recent 
years, from certain spending (on consumer durables) and 
investment decisions being taken after their postponement during 
the most acute phases of the crisis is expected to gradually peter 
out. Indeed it is estimated that, in 2017 Q3, GDP growth could 
have decelerated somewhat, as anticipated in the June 
projections. As a result of all the above, it is estimated that, after 
growing by 3.1% this year, GDP will grow by 2.5% in 2018 and by 
2.2% in 2019 (see Table 2).
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019)
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Cut-off date for preparation of assumptions: 18 September 2017. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated 
on the basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in growth rates for world output and export markets, in levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, in percentages for the nominal 
effective exchange rate and in percentage points for interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate reflects an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
International environment
    World output 3.0 3.5 3.6 3.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
1.0-0.04.06.39.31.55.2stekram tropxe s’niapS    
1.39.22.16.453.457.250.44)level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
01.001.050.002.102.131.111.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Nominal effective exchange rate against non-euro area countries (c)
    (2000=100 and percentage differences) 113.6 117.3 122.5 122.5 3.9 7.8 7.8
1.0-1.0-0.01.0-3.0-3.0-3.0-)d( )robiruE htnom-3( setar tseretni mret-trohS    
2.0-2.0-1.0-3.29.16.14.1)d( )dleiy dnob raey-01( setar tseretni mret-gnoL    
Changes from the June 
2017 projections (b)
September 2017 projections
Table 1 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2017-2019): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the eurosystem’s June 2017 joint 
forecasting exercise.
2  On 12  September, the National Statistics Institute (INE) published a 
revision of the Annual National Accounts series which entails slightly 
higher GDP growth in 2015 and 2016, together with more significant 
changes in the rates of growth of other variables, such as the different 
demand components. Accordingly, for example in 2016, GDP growth 
was more reliant on the external component than had been estimated to 
date. It has not been possible to include this information in the 
projections, since the models used require quarterly series and such 
series consistent with the latest annual data will not be published until 
2 October.
3  The cut‑off date for preparation of the assumptions underlying the June 
exercise was 16 May. The cut-off date for preparation of the assumptions 
underlying this exercise is 18 September, except for those relating to 
external market developments for which the assumptions for the current 
exercise are taken from the September 2017 ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, whose cut-off date is 14 August. The cut-
off date for preparation of the projections is 25 September.
4  Box 1.2 of Chapter 1 of the Banco de España’s 2016 Annual Report has 
an estimate of the contribution made by predominantly temporary 
factors to GDP growth throughout the current expansionary phase.
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As regards consumer prices, the rate of change of the non‑energy 
component is expected to rise gently, as a consequence of the 
continuation of the expansionary phase, prompting first a 
narrowing of the negative gap between actual and potential output 
levels and subsequently a shift to a positive gap. However, this is 
only expected to translate into a pick‑up in headline inflation from 
the beginning of next year, since until then the impact of the 
slowdown in energy prices compared with a year earlier will 
prevail.5 Thus, it is estimated that, in annual average terms, the 
rate of increase of the CPI will decelerate from 1.9% in 2017 to 
1.3% in 2018, before reaccelerating to 1.6% in 2019.
Compared with the June projections, the most significant change 
in the technical assumptions underlying this exercise is the 
appreciation of the euro exchange rate, which in nominal effective 
terms amounts to approximately 8% against the non‑euro area 
countries. Changes in the other assumptions are more modest. In 
particular, the path of oil prices measured in US dollars is similar to 
that considered in the previous projection exercise, with a slightly 
steeper slope, meaning that at the end of the projection horizon 
this variable is approximately $3  per barrel higher than three 
months ago. In the period elapsed since the previous projections, 
the expected paths of sovereign bond and, to a lesser extent, 
interbank market interest rates have fallen slightly, in accordance 
with the expectations implicit in the yield curves, giving rise to a 
decline in the cost of credit to households and non‑financial 
corporations. Lastly, there has been an upward revision of the rate 
of growth of export markets in 2017. However, this change in the 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure: 2017 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 25 September 2017.
b The rates of change in 2016 that refer to the National Accounts series have been updated to include the revision of the Annnual National Accounts for the years 
2014-16 published by the INE on 12 September. The new figures for net lending / net borrowing of the nation and of the general government will be published 
on 2 October.
Changes from the June 2017 
projections
2016 (b) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
0.00.00.02.25.21.32.33.3PDG
0.00.03.0-5.10.24.22.30.3noitpmusnoc etavirP
0.00.02.08.08.00.18.08.0noitpmusnoc tnemnrevoG
2.0-2.0-6.00.44.43.41.33.3noitamrof latipac dexif ssorG
2.0-4.0-8.16.48.44.50.59.4tnempiuqe ni tnemtsevnI  
3.0-1.0-4.0-3.47.46.39.14.2noitcurtsnoc ni tnemtsevnI  
3.0-3.0-5.0-5.46.44.64.48.4secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE
3.0-4.0-8.0-2.41.40.53.37.2secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
National demand (contribution to growth) 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net external demand (contribution to growth) 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
1.0-1.0-1.0-6.39.30.46.36.3PDG lanimoN
1.0-0.01.0-5.14.19.03.03.0rotalfed PDG
0.00.01.0-6.13.19.12.0-2.0-)IPC( xedni ecirp remusnoC
CPI excluding energy and unprocessed food prices 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
0.00.02.0-8.12.27.29.20.3)stnelaviuqe emit-lluf( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force). 
End-of-period data 18.6 18.6 16.3 14.4 12.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Unemployment rate (% of labour force). 
Average data 19.6 19.6 17.1 15.1 13.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) of the nation 
(% of GDP) — 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
General government net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) 
(% of GDP) — -4.5 -3.2 -2.6 -2.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
September 2017 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S MAIN MACRO MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
5  For a description of the role played by base effects in the behaviour of 
inflation, see Box 4 “Inflation developments and outlook in Spain” in the 
Quarterly Report on the Spanish Economy, Economic Bulletin 1/2017, 
Banco de España.
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annual average is actually due to the better performance observed 
in the year to date compared with the June projection, as the 
changes are almost negligible over the entire projection horizon.
The changes to the public finance assumptions for 2017‑19 
compared with the previous projection exercise are minimal. For 
2017, the fiscal projections are based on the measures approved 
in the budgets of the different tiers of general government for this 
year and on the budget outturn observed to date. Regarding the 
assumptions for the rest of the projection horizon, on the cut‑off 
date for preparation of these projections the draft State and Social 
Security Budget for 2018 had not been submitted. In this setting, 
various technical assumptions have been used to estimate the 
fiscal variables for 2018‑19. First, it has been assumed that the 
budget headings subject to greater scope for discretion – notably 
including, by virtue of their volume, procurement and public 
investment – will evolve in keeping with the nominal potential 
growth of the Spanish economy, and second, that all other general 
government account items will evolve, in the absence of measures, 
in keeping with their usual determinants.6 
As was the case in June, these projections do not take into 
account a number of temporary factors that are included in the 
April 2017 Stability Programme but have not yet taken shape.7
In accordance with these assumptions and projections on fiscal 
policy variables, and with the output gap estimated on a consistent 
basis within the whole projection exercise, the fiscal policy stance 
is expected to be virtually neutral in the period 2017‑19, after the 
expansionary phase of 2015‑16.
Overall, the changes in the various assumptions – including the 
fiscal assumptions – compared with the previous projection 
exercise would give rise, in accordance with historically estimated 
impacts, to a modest downward revision of the growth projections 
for activity and prices.
However, the present projections coincide, in terms of annual 
average GDP and CPI growth rates, with those published in June, 
save for consumer price inflation in 2017 which is now expected to 
be 0.1 pp lower than projected in June. 
In terms of GDP, the reason for the absence of revisions to the 
June projections is that the effects of differing signs that several 
significant factors have had on activity have offset each other. The 
data on the Spanish economy’s external markets in the most 
recent period have been more favourable than was expected a few 
months ago. This effect essentially counters the overall moderately 
adverse impact of the changes in some of the other technical 
assumptions and, in particular, of the effect of the appreciation of 
the euro.
As regards the latter, the baseline scenario considers that the 
impact of the exchange rate appreciation on activity and prices 
will be quite limited. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the 
available estimates indicate that the response of prices and 
activity depends on the shock that gave rise to the exchange 
rate movement. In particular, the more closely related that 
movement is to an improved outlook for economic activity in the 
euro area vis‑à‑vis its trading partners, as in the present case, 
the lower the impact. Second, the available evidence suggests 
that in recent years the scale of pass‑through of exchange rate 
movements has decreased, possibly as a result of factors such 
as heightened global competition (that would encourage foreign 
exporters competing with domestic products to refrain from 
passing the full extent of exchange rate movements through to 
their prices, in order to maintain their market shares) or a more 
stable inflation environment (that would contribute to only the 
most persistent and largest exchange rate movements being 
passed through).8
The reason for the downward revision by 0.1  pp in estimated 
average inflation for 2017 is that recently some components have 
shown lower than expected rates of growth. CPI inflation 
projections are unchanged for the following two years as a result 
of two contrasting effects: specifically the steeper oil price curve, 
prompting an upward revision of the energy component, which is 
countered by the moderate downward revision of the CPI 
excluding energy and unprocessed food prices as a result of the 
appreciation of the euro.
GDP growth will continue to be underpinned by national demand 
momentum, which is backed, in turn, by the improvement in the 
balance sheets of private agents in the economy and by the 
continuing favourable financial conditions. However, despite 
remaining high, national expenditure will tend to become less 
buoyant over the projection horizon, in a continuation of the 
pattern already observed in 2016, as the effects of the positive 
impact of fiscal policy and lower oil prices on private agents’ 
income fade. Similarly, although foreign trade in goods and 
services will also continue to make a net positive contribution to 
GDP growth, that contribution is expected to be lower in 2018 and 
2019 than in the two previous years, owing to the exchange rate 
appreciation effect, the expected gradual growth slowdown in 
external markets and a prudent extrapolation to the future of the 
relatively weak import performance in the recent past.
BOX 1
 
MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
6  Specifically it has been assumed that, aside of the deferred impact of 
the legislative changes approved in the second half of 2016, public 
revenue will increase in keeping with its tax bases, which depend mainly 
on the macroeconomic environment. Similar assumptions have been 
made for expenditure items that offer less scope for discretion, such as 
pensions (where developments are essentially determined by the 
revaluation formula established by law and by population ageing), 
unemployment benefits (which depend mainly on the level of 
unemployment) and interest (affected by changes in public debt levels 
and interest rates).
7  This refers, in particular, to possible costs associated with the public 
liability arising from court proceedings relating to toll motorway company 
insolvency proceedings, expected to materialise in the period 2017‑19.
8  See “Exchange rate pass‑through into euro area inflation”, Economic 
Bulletin, ECB, November 2016.
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The strength of the job creation process will continue to underpin 
private consumption. However, although no significant changes 
are expected in apparent labour productivity, the projected 
slowdown in GDP growth implies a lower increase in employment 
and, therefore, also in household income. It is estimated that the 
savings rate will tend to stabilise, after the recent decline, and the 
good employment performance and continued favourable financial 
conditions will help prolong the recovery in residential investment, 
although unequally across the regions (see Box 4).
After the volatile pattern observed in recent quarters, shaped by 
changes to corporate income tax legislation in the last stretch of 
2016, business investment will grow at a pace consistent with that of 
final demand; this entails a moderate deceleration over the projection 
horizon. This slowdown will, however, be quite limited, in a setting in 
which business funding will be supported by the continued strong 
generation of internal funds, restructuring of balance sheets and the 
availability of external financing at a low cost.
Exports are expected to continue growing at a slightly higher pace 
than their destination markets over the entire projection period, 
reflecting both the competitiveness gains achieved compared with 
the rest of the euro area in past years and those expected over the 
projection horizon. Imports, for their part, are expected to grow at 
a slower pace than their historical relationship with final demand 
would warrant, reflecting the inclusion of the assumption that the 
competitive adjustment of the economy has begun to translate 
into a certain degree of import substitution.
As has been the case throughout the expansionary phase, GDP 
growth will remain highly labour intensive, assisted by the 
moderate rate of growth of unit labour costs. The relatively high 
rates of job creation will continue to help reduce the unemployment 
rate which, at the end of the projection horizon, will be below 13% 
of the labour force.
Under the assumptions for the exercise, the Spanish economy will 
continue to record a net lending position vis‑à‑vis the rest of the 
world that is expected to remain slightly over 2% of GDP throughout 
the period considered, in a setting in which, as indicated above, 
net external demand is expected to continue to make a positive 
contribution to GDP growth. 
In the final stretch of 2017, consumer price inflation will be shaped 
by the slowdown in the energy component, as the impact of the 
spike in oil prices in the second half of 2016 disappears from the 
year‑on‑year comparison, resulting in a very low headline inflation 
rate at the end of 2017 and the start of 2018. At the same time, the 
CPI excluding energy and unprocessed food prices is expected to 
climb gradually throughout the period considered, in a setting in 
which the prolonged recovery will push up the degree of use of 
productive resources. However, these prices will increase gradually 
and moderately, against a backdrop in which unit labour costs are 
expected to slowly rise. As a result of all the above, it is estimated 
that the rate of increase of the CPI excluding energy and 
unprocessed food prices will pick up from 1.1% in 2017 to 1.7% 
in 2019, while that of the CPI will decelerate from 1.9% in 2017 to 
1.3% in 2018, before reaccelerating to 1.6% in 2019.
Turning to the risks surrounding these GDP growth projections, on 
the domestic front, the political tension in Catalonia could 
potentially affect agents’ confidence and their spending decisions 
and financing conditions. On the external front, several sources of 
geopolitical risk persist that may threaten the global economic 
recovery, on top of the uncertainties surrounding the course of the 
Brexit process and economic policies in some advanced 
economies, such as the doubts regarding the future course of 
fiscal policy in the United States. On the financial markets, the 
ample liquidity and low volatility levels may give rise to sharp 
adjustments in some asset prices, with adverse effects on 
financing conditions for agents. Also, given the high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the course of the euro exchange rate and 
its determinants, and its final impact on the Spanish economy, the 
possibility that this variable may have a higher impact on these 
projections than is considered in the baseline scenario cannot be 
ruled out. In general, the downside risks relating to the external 
context of the Spanish economy described above tend to shape a 
downside risk environment for prices also.
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2017-2019) (cont’d)
